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THE CHEETAH IN AFRICA UNDER THREAT 
Norman Myers* 
INTRODUCTION 
According to a two-year survey, Africa probably contained in 1974 
fewer than 25,000 cheetah, possibly as few as 10,000. More 
important, the total which was almost certainly twice as high in 
1960, could well be reduced by half again by 1980.1 The downward 
trend is more significant than the total number. 
The principal problem lies with disruption of cheetah habitats 
and life-support systems, due to increasing antagonism of livestock 
owners toward wild predators and to settlement of savannah grass-
lands by cultivators who can no longer find sufficient room in Af-
rica's limited zones of intensive agriculture. This trend toward in-
creased antagonism and settlement reflects a number of economic 
relationships between the advanced world and emergent Africa. To 
this degree, the chief threat to the cheetah derives not from persons 
posing a direct and deliberate threat (poachers and fur trade opera-
tors), but from people whose activities induce unwitting pressures 
on the cheetah's welfare. 
Past conservation initiatives, like the Washington Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora,2 have brought direct relief to hundreds of threatened species 
• Consultant in Environmental Conservation, Nairobi, Kenya; Member, International 
Council for Environmental Law. 
1 Myers, The Cheetah Acinonyx jubatus in Africa, Monograph No.4, Int'l Union for Con-
servation of Nature and Nat. Resource (IVCN) Morges, Switzerland (1975). 
2 Among recent writings see Toward Legal Rights For Animals, 4 ENv. Arr. 205 (1975); 
Endangered Species Protection: A History of Congressional Action, 4 ENv. Arr. 255 (1975). 
Certain other writings are also relevant to this general area. While much has been written 
about the role of environmental conservation law within a national context, less attention has 
been directed at the more similar efforts of legal and related institutional initiatives to assist 
conservation at the international level. Also see Bleicher, An Overview of International Envi-
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through intervention of the law.3 However, such initiatives, which 
focus on direct and deliberate threats to animals, afford only mar-
ginal aid to the cheetah. Even if the international fur trade were to 
conform to the Washington Convention's requirements by terminat-
ing all dealings in cheetah skins, the main threat to the cheetah 
would remain! 
The cheetah needs assistance of more comprehensive scope than 
direct legal protection against a few harmful trade practices. It 
needs support that safeguards the species' life-support systems, as 
well as individual animals' lives. This postulates broadly-conceived 
economic and political initiatives as well as legal programs. Such 
initiatives, in the spirit of the Washington Convention, must reflect 
the role of communities outside Africa which contribute to the de-
cline of African wildlife. Furthermore, the cheetah serves as an 
illustration of the pressures that increasingly afflict developing-
world wildlife through loss of habitat and disruption of life-support 
systems. To that extent, the cheetah's plight illustrates emergent 
needs for a multitude of threatened species. 
BIO-ECOLOGICAL BACKGROUND 
Certain characteristics of the cheetah's ecology and ethology 
make it more vulnerable than most predators to threats within its 
ronmental Regulation, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1972); Contini & Sand, Methods to Expedite Envi-
ronment Protection: International Ecostandards, 66 Am. J. Int'l L. 37 (1972); R. FALK, THIs 
ENDANGERED PLANET (1972); Falk, Environmental Policy as a World Order Problem, 12 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 161 (1972); Frank, International Legal Mechanisms for the Protection of Endan-
gered Species (paper presented at AAAS Meeting on Endangered Species, San Francisco 
(Feb. 27-28, 1974)); Grieves, International Law and the Environmental Issue, 1 ENV. AFF. 826 
(1972); Hansen, Creating New International Arrangements for Environmental Quality 
Control, 3 NAT. REsOURCES LAW 739 (1970); LAw, INSTITUTIONS AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 
(J. Hargrove ed. 1972); D. KAY & E. SKOLNIKOFF, WORLD Eco-CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL ORGANI-
SATION IN RESPONSE (1972); MacDonald, International Institutions for Environmental 
Management, 26 INT'L ORGANISATION 372 (1972); McDougall, Legal Bases for Securing the 
Integrity of the Earth-Space Environment, ANNALS OF THE NEW YORK ACADEMY OF SCIENCE 
(1971); Robinson, International Obligations for National Protection of the Environment 
(paper presented at Meeting of Environmental Lawyers, Moscow (June 20-24,1974); J. SAX, 
DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT (1970); and T. WILSON, JR., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL Ac-
TION: A GLOBAL SURVEY (1971). 
3 ENVIR. L. REp. 1350 (1973). 
• The Convention has not yet been ratified by France, Spain and Japan among major 
consumer countries and is in force in only one (South Africa) out of 20 countries in Africa 
with significant cheetah populations. See Bulletin of the Int'l Union for Conservation of 
Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), Morges, Switzerland, New Series Vol. 7, nos. 8-9,11 
(Aug., Sept. and Dec. 1976). 
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wildland ecosystems, even before introduction of man's disruptive 
practices. Indeed the cheetah has never been numerous as compared 
with other cats in Africa. The lion inhabits many different wilder-
ness zones and the leopard inhabits virtually all biotic provinces of 
Africa, but the cheetah's main habitats are confined to savannah 
grasslands.5 To a visitor travelling across the Serengeti Plains and 
other well-known wildlife areas of northern Tanzania and southern 
Kenya, open grasslands appear to be characteristic landscapes of 
wilderness Africa. Yet these savannahs make up less than 10 percent 
of Africa south of the Sahara.8 In fact 100 years ago, before extensive 
modification of Africa's wildland environments, there may not have 
been more than 100,000 cheetah, as compared with possibly 250,000 
lions and a far larger number of leopards.7 
Moreover, whereas the lion often maintains densities as high as 
one animal to five square miles, and the leopard higher densities 
still, the cheetah rarely achieves a density higher than one to 
twenty-five square miles, frequently only one to one hundred square 
miles.s These low densities for the cheetah are partly due to carni-
vore competition. While many predators are nocturnal and use a 
stealthy close-quarters attack, the cheetah hunts by extended chase 
during the day, a practice which makes its hunting activities con-
spicuous .. A cheetah with a newly-caught prey quickly attracts 
other carnivores which come to deprive it of its food. Being light in 
build and little able to defend its kill, the cheetah is frequently 
robbed of its prey by lions, leopards, and especially by spotted 
hyenas. lo Moreover, the cheetah, a lone hunter, cannot overpower 
• See Myers, supra note 1. For further details on the cheetah, see R. EATON, THE CHEETAH: 
THE BIOLOGY, ECOLOGY AND BEHAVIOR Or AN ENDANGERED SPECIES (1974); W. Labuschagne, 
Ecology and Ethology of the Cheetah in Kruger and Kalahari Gemsbok National Parks, 
South Africa (1975) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Univ. of Pretoria); R. McLaughin, Aspects 
of the Biology of Cheetahs, Acinonyx Jubatus (Schreber), In Nairobi National Park (1970) 
(unpublished M.Sc. thesis, Univ. of Nairobi); and N. WROGEMANN, CHEETAH UNDER THE SUN 
(1975). For details of the lion, leopard and other large predators, see Myers, The Leopard 
Panthera Pardus in Africa, Monograph No.5, Int'l Union for Conservation of Nat. Resources 
(IUCN), Morges, Switzerland (1976); de V. Pienaar, Predator-Prey Relations Among the 
Larger Mammals of the Kruger National Park, 12 KOEDOE 108; G. SCHALLER, THE SERENGETI 
LION (1972). 
• See Myers, supra note 1; Eaton, N. WROGEMANN and MyERS, supra note 5. 
7 These totals remained steady until the 1960's. See Myers, supra note 1; Myers, supra note 
5. 
• See Myers, supra note 1; EATON, Labuschagne, McLaughlin, and N. WROGEMANN, supra 
note 5. 
'Id. 
" Id. See also H. KRUUK, THE SPO'M'ED HYENA (1972); MYERS, The Cheetah's Relationships 
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large prey, and usually kills small or medium-sized animals. A chee-
tah does not store food, or scavenge, and must kill two or three times 
as often as a lion or a leopard. 11 If a fight in defense of a prey carcass 
leaves a cheetah with only a minor injury to a leg, the cheetah may 
be unable to sustain a chase when it pursues its next prey. 
The cheetah's young are likewise vulnerable. They cannot climb 
trees like leopard cubs and they cannot rely on "baby sitting" safe-
guards such as lions sometimes employ.12 Cheetah cubs must follow 
their mother on wide-ranging treks across open country, and become 
targets for mammal carnivores and birds of prey. They also seem 
unusually susceptible to disease. Although cheetahs reproduce at 
higher rates than do lions or leopards, the number of young cheetahs 
reaching adulthood often achieves no more than replacement. 13 
While cheetah litters may total as many as five or six cubs with 
three or four reaching juvenile status, populations remain appar-
ently stable at numerical levels far below thosE'; for most other large 
carnivores of Africa. 14 
To cite a specific instance, the Serengeti Park in northern Tanza-
nia covers an area of 10,000 square miles, of which at least half is 
grassland or open woodland, with half a million gazelles. Yet in 
these seemingly favorable hunting conditions, the ecosystem's stock 
of cheetah remains at 200-250, or one to 40-50 square miles. 15 This 
density typifies cheetah populations in ecosystems elsewhere in sa-
vannah Africa. Part of the explanation for the low figure probably 
lies with disease, and part lies with Serengeti's 900 leopards, 2000 
lions, and 3000 hyenas, which exert indirect competitive pressure 
and direct predatory pressure that keep the cheetah a relatively rare 
creature .18 
The evolutionary strategy of low densities has presumably served 
to the Spotted Hyena, AMERICAN ASS'N OF MAMMALOLOGISTS, Proceedings of Predator Sympos-
ium, Univ. of Montana, June 16-18, 1975 (in press, 1977). 
" [d. 
12 [d. For details of lions' "baby sitting" activities, see SCHALLER, supra note 5. Social 
systems among lions and especially among females, center on the pride, an assembly of 
mostly female adults. Sometimes, when a lioness with cubs needs to hunt, she leaves her cubs 
with other lionesses of the pride to safeguard the defenseless offspring against hyenas, leop-
ards, jackals, eagles and other predators. The cheetah, by contrast, is a much more solitary 
animal, and a mother cheetah hardly ever finds she can leave her cubs with another adult 
while she goes off hunting. 
\. See Myers, supra note 1; EATON, N. WROGEMANN and Myers, supra note 5. 
" Exceptions include the wild dog or African hunting dog. [d. 
15 See SCHALLER, supra note 5; KRUUK, supra note 10. 
II See Myers, supra note 1. 
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the cheetah well because its populations have never been large and 
concentrated enough to supply a favorable resource for predators or 
for pathogens and parasites. Moreover, a wide, though patchy, dis-
tribution decreases the probability of a catastrophic event causing 
extinction for populations over the species' entire range at one time. 
As long as a particular stock always restored its numbers through 
immigration of additional cheetah from populations elsewhere, the 
species could survive. Fortunately, the cheetah shows more capacity 
to colonize sparsely occupied areas than does the lion, for example. 
Yet, ironically, this strategy now proves a massive liability for the 
cheetah. As its savannah habitats become modified through man's 
influence, its populations cannot maintain contact with each other 
so well as in the past. This proves a much greater threat for the 
cheetah than it would for the lion or the leopard, which exist at 
higher densities. Lions and leopards do not seem susceptible to so 
many "natural" threats, and need not rely upon immigration of 
additional populations. 
Because of these characteristics, Africa's protected areas offer 
little sanctuary for cheetah. Although savannah parks and reserves 
cover at least 150,000 square miles, an area almost as large as Cali-
fornia, cheetah are found in only about one third of them, where 
they total only 3000 individuals at most.17 As park surroundings 
become developed, parks will become ecologically isolated from one 
another. This means that park populations of cheetah, many total-
ling only a few hundred individuals at most, will become cut off 
from one another. Each cheetah population will, thereby, become 
susceptible to a variety of natural catastrophes, including pandemic 
diseases, changes in prey community make-up, increased competi-
tion from other carnivores, alterations in vegetation configuration, 
and similar shifts in ecosystem dynamics. Cheetah are unusually 
sensitive to such catastrophes. Parks as ultimate sanctuaries, there-
fore, represent a high-fisk strategy, for immigration between iso-
lated parks to restore populations will become impossible. In any 
case, parks themselves are not certain to survive in the long term. 18 
Similar constraints would apply to areas specially given over to pro-
tecting the cheetah, since the species is dependent more than most 
large predators on overall stability in its life-support systems, which 
17 See Myers, supra note 1. I. Myers, National Parks in Savannah Africa, 178 SCIENCE 1255 (1972); THE LONG AFRICAN 
DAY (1972). 
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implies natural environments with full diversity of associated spec-
ies. Such diversity would be less likely to exist were preservation 
efforts to focus exclusively on the species itself.IB 
AFRICAN LAW AND WILDLIFE CONSERVATION 
Review of the history and status of wildlife law in Africa focuses 
the cheetah's plight from a legal perspective. Remarkably, there has 
been quite a history of legal initiatives to safeguard Mrican wildlife, 
not only by individual countries but by the continent as a unit. 
In 1900, first steps were taken toward an international agreement 
for wildlife conservation throughout colonial Mrica,20 but the effort 
proved abortive. Simultaneously, most colonial governments took 
steps to regulate hunting of wild creatures within their holdings. In 
1933, the London Convention Relative to The Preservation of Fauna 
and Flora in Their Natural State was drawn Up.21 This Convention, 
signed by all the main colonial powers, and Egypt, Sudan, and 
South Africa, was the first substantive treaty under international 
law aimed at safeguarding wildlife resources and natural environ-
ments in Africa. Not only were wild animals protected from the 
sporting rifle, but wild plants and vegetation were protected from 
the plough. Special attention was directed at East and Central Af-
rica, the main areas containing great throngs of savannah game. 
This document proved a farsighted agreement, providing some secu-
rity for wild creatures and for their habitats. The Convention cov-
ered hunting, parks and reserves, and trade in trophies. Contracting 
governments agreed to enact legislation to enforce the Convention's 
Ii These circumstances also mean that the cheetah's eventual prospects could be worse 
than those for the Bengal tiger. The tiger now totals fewer than 2,000 left in the wild. The 
Challenge of the Tiger: Saving an Endangered Species, in WORLD WILDLIFE YEARBOOK 1973-
74 (P. Jackson ed. 1975). Nevertheless, the tiger lends itself to a "sanctuary strategy" and 
can be adequately safeguarded through a string of parks and reserves which nations of the 
Indian subcontinent are establishing for its protection. Id. A 500-square mile piece of forest 
habitat can protect at least five and sometimes ten times as many tigers as a similar-sized 
piece of savannah achieves for the cheetah. Moreover, a remnant population of 100 tigers 
stands a better chance of surviving as a viable gene pool than 100 cheetahs because the tigers 
would not be susceptible to such severe "natural pressures" (e.g., disease, competition from 
other carnivores) as would cheetah. If cheetah in Africa continue to decline at present rates 
for another 10 years, efforts to save the species in the wild could cost more per unit animal 
and per unit part of the species than efforts to save the tiger, with less assurance that the 
investment would payoff . 
.. For a detailed review see Ogundere, The Development of International Environmental 
Law and Policy in Africa, 12 NAT. RESOURCES J. 255 (1972); Burhenne, The African Conven-
tion for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, 2 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 105 
(1970). 
21 Id. 
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provisions. The Convention, however, was ineffective. Few govern-
ments took the legislative steps required, and those that did rarely 
enforced their laws. 22 
By the early 1960's, as numerous African countries became inde-
pendent, a new conservation initiative was needed. The need was 
two-fold: to provide a basis for national legislation and to coordinate 
conservation measures across frontiers. In 1963 the Commission for 
Technical Cooperation in Africa South of the Sahara, together with 
the Scientific Council for Africa, adopted an African Charter for 
Protection and Conservation of Nature, a document that enshrined 
modern ecological principles. 23 The Charter catalysed a process of 
intergovernmental consultations, leading to a 1965 request from the 
Organization of African Unity for the two main United Nations 
agencies involved24 to draft, in conjunction with the International 
Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, a broad-
scope document that would reflect modern needs. In 1968, 38 Afri-
can governments signed a new treaty, The African Convention for 
Nature and Natural Resources. 25 However, not all states in Africa 
signed, and not all signatories ratified. Most significantly, only a 
few ratifiers did much to implement the Convention. The treaty did 
serve as a guide for those countries wishing to enact realistic legisla-
tion for conservation of their wildlife, vegetation, soil, water, and 
other natural resources. 
In particular, the Convention drew up lists of wildlife species 
deserving special protection.26 According to the Convention, class A 
species receive total protection in contracting states, whereby "the 
hunting, killing, capture or collection of specimens shall be permit-
ted only on the authorization in each case of the highest competent 
authority and only if required in the national interest or for scien-
tific purposes."27 This list includes the cheetah.28 
Almost all African countries now extend complete protection to 
the cheetah. The main exception is Namibia (S.W. Africa), which 
is nevertheless considering new legislation to give the cheetah in-
22 [d. 
23 [d. 
" Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). 
23 For full text of the Convention, see Burhenne, supra note 20. 
" See Article VIII of the Convention. 
" See note 25, supra. 
" The cheetah is the only one listed of seven major widely-distributed carnivores in Africa. 
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creased if not total protection.29 But in virtually all countries law 
enforcement agencies are meager, and with so many other law en-
forcement problems, wildlife in general, let alone threatened spec-
ies, receives little attention.30 
BASIS OF CONSERVATION STRATEGY FOR THE CHEETAH 
As indicated above, the cheetah's long-term survival in the wild 
depends largely on areas outside parks and reserves. These areas are 
now undergoing rapid development and disruption. Conservation 
strategy should therefore emphasize integration of the cheetah's 
needs with competitive human activities in large tracts of savannah 
Africa-a process that requires broadly-conceived conservation ini-
tiatives, in contrast to limited-focus measures such as parks and 
reserves. 
This integration postulates an expanded approach to conserva-
tion in Africa. Parks and reserves seek only to establish islands of 
wilderness within a sea of development; legal efforts and practices 
in Africa have mainly aimed at safeguarding wildlife against hostile 
activities such as poaching. The broader problem is to coordinate 
the cheetah's needs with a spectrum of human demands in savan-
nah territories. In other words, the challenge is to achieve a balance 
between safeguard measures for the cheetah and competitive 
human interests, rather than to defend the cheetah's needs as if 
cheetah values were absolutes in the equation. This form of conser-
vation should not seek to protect wildlife in conflict with an 
"enemy" of human development activities, but in complementary 
accord with whatever other forms of land use lay claim to savannah 
resources. Since habitat loss is likely to become the principal threat 
to creatures not only in Africa but in other similar parts of the 
developing world, a solution for the cheetah could serve as a model 
for conservation plans that many species in many areas will require 
in the years ahead. 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AS A THREAT TO THE CHEETAH 
(a) Pressures within Africa 
Despite its "natural" handicaps, the cheetah has maintained 
numbers and densities which have proved stable enough across 
" Personal communication from officials of Department of Nature Conservation, Win-
dhoek, Namibia (1976). 
30 See Myers, supra note 1. 
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broad tracts of Africa for centuries. But the past decade has wit-
nessed a change. Pressures which eliminated the cheetah over the 
greater part of its range in Asia are fast gathering force in Mrica. 
Two different communities contribute to the creature's decline: 
stockmen and cultivators. Stockmen of all kinds, including com-
mercial operators,31 pastoralists attempting upgraded husbandry,32 
and nomadic stockmen struggling to survive,33 are turning against 
the cheetah. These groups assert that cheetah are now taking in-
creasing numbers of calves, sheep, and goats. While the allegations 
are often grossly exaggerated, cheetah doubtlessly stray among 
domestic herds more frequently than they did in the past due to 
intensifying land use pressures in the environs. At the same time, 
the cheetah's natural prey in these livestock areas diminishes 
through increased competition from domestic herds for range re-
sources such as forage and water. In Kenya, Tanzania, Botswana, 
Rhodesia, and Namibia-all countries with major cheetah popula-
tions-livestock numbers have increased during the past twenty-
five years at rates between 4 and 8 percent per year.34 As its natural 
prey declines, the cheetah raids domestic stock. The stockman, in 
his attempt to make stock raising more efficient, now seeks to en-
sure profit from every animal in his holding, so he is less likely to 
remain ignorant of, or to ignore, occasional depredations by chee-
tah. Although other predators also maraud on domestic herds for 
similar reasons, the cheetah is by far the easiest for the stockman 
to kill, due to its open-range daytime hunting. 
To cite some specific instances, the 2100-square mile Liebig's 
Ranch in Rhodesia increased its cattle holding between 1966 and 
1972 from 35,000 to 55,000 head.35 During the same period, its im-
pala and other antelope stocks, traditional prey for the cheetah, 
decreased markedly, and cheetah attacks on calves and sheep in-
creased eight times. 3ft Another rancher in the same lowveld area lost 
only an occasional animal to cheetah during 20 years, until two 
calves were taken in 1969, six in 1970, eight in 1971 and over 20 in 
31 For example, ranchers in Kenya and southern Africa. 
32 For example, the Massai in East Africa and the Herero in Namibia. 
33 For example, the Tuareg and Peul in the Sahel zone of West Africa. 
" See Myers, supra note 1. Tanzania had 6 million cattle in 1950, 10 million in 1966, and 
almost 15 million in 1975. 
35 [d. Rhodesia had 4 million cattle in 1967 and almost 5 million in 1975. 
" [d. Figures are available only up to the time of the author's visit to the country in 1972, 
but stock losses are reputed to have continued to rise since then. 
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1972.37 A large ranch in Namibia lost 43 calves, valued at $1400, to 
cheetah in 1971.38 Another Namibia rancher, with strong conserva-
tionist convictions, began live-trapping cheetah on his property for 
release into parks and reserves; between 1954 and 1972 he caught 
154 cheetah (and 186 leopards), yet he lost 68 calves and 102 sheep 
in 1972 (only a few to leopards).39 
Stockmen are not the only threat to the cheetah. Increasing 
congestion now exists in the small-sized and over-loaded fertile 
zones that comprise less than 10 percent of Africa south of the 
Sahara, and cultivators are spreading into the next most favorable 
areas for human settlement, the savannah grasslands. Since these 
savannah zones are limited, they are at a premium for both human 
expansion and the cheetah's survival. In parts of Kenya, Ethiopia, 
Tanzania, Zambia, Sudan, and Cameroon, this migratory pattern 
causes human populations in savannahlands to expand at rates far 
above those due to natural increase.4o Africa's rural population is 
expected to increase by 15 percent in 1976-1980.41 A disproportionate 
part of this increase will take place in the savannah zones, and the 
cheetah's effective range could be cut by as much as 30 percent 
during this short period alone. 
These two threats to the cheetah, from stock-owning communities 
and from cultivators, are now of much more consequence than 
poachers who cater to the international fur trade. 
17 Id . 
.. Id. This loss by a Namibia rancher could have been more apparent than would have been 
the case in former years, since the rancher was keeping more accurate records of his herds. 
But his assertion that cheetah had grown more numerous could be true as he had carried out 
intensive trapping campaigns against hyenas and jackals, both of which prey on cheetah cubs . 
•• Id . 
•• I-ll POPULATION IN AFRICA DEVELOPMENT (P. Cantrelle ed. 1975); J. CONDE, THE DEMO-
GRAPHIC TRANSITION As ApPLIED To TROPICAL AFRICA (1971); J. CONDE, SOME DEMOGRAPHIC 
ASPECTS OF HUMAN RESOURCES IN AFRICA (1973); ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA, REpORT 
OF THE AFRICAN POPULATION CONFERENCE, Accra, Ghana, Dec. 9-18, 1971 (1972); ECONOMIC 
COMMISSION FOR AFRICA, ApPLICATION OF DEMOGRAPHIC DATA TO DEVELOPMENT PLANNING, AFRI-
CAN POPULATION STUDIES No.1 (1974); W. HANCE, POPULATION, MIGRATION AND URBANIZATION 
IN AFRICA (1970); Myers, supra note 18; Myers, The People Crunch Comes to East Africa, 
NAT. HIST. (Jan. 1973); S. OMINDE & C. EJIOGU, POPULATION GROWTH AND ECONOMIC DEVELOP-
MENT IN AFRICA (1972); N. VAN RENSBURG, POPULATION EXPLOSION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA (1972); 
Wisner & Mbithi, Drought in Eastern Kenya (paper presented at 22 Int'l Geog. Congress, 
Commission on Man and Environment, Calgary, Alberta, Canada (July 24-30, 1972) (these 
latter two writers cited rates of population increase in savannah-lands of eastern Kenya as 
high as 10-35 percent per year) . 
.. See CONDE AND ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA, supra note 40; see also C. OXBY, 
PASTORAL NOMADS AND DEVELOPMENT (1975) 
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(b) Pressures from Outside Africa 
Pressures from human communities stem not only directly from 
increasing African populations with growing aspirations, but also 
derive indirectly from the developed world's desire for more goods 
of the kind which induce land use changes in African savannahs. For 
example, livestock owners in Africa now seek to respond to the 
world's beef shortage. Worldwide demand for meat is projected to 
rise by 3.1 percent per year between 1970 and 1990, with demand 
for beef increasing by 4 percent per year}2 This rate of increase is 
higher than the rate of increase in demand for other foods except 
fish. The demand for beef causes stockmen to occupy rangelands 
formerly little used. In Kenya, for example, 80,000 square miles or 
one third of the country will be subject to varying levels of intensive 
livestock production, an area five times greater than commercial 
enterprises have hitherto occupied. 43 At the same time, stockmen 
receive increasingly narrow profit margins, induced in part by inter-
national market constraints. These twin factors-increased exten-
siveness and intensiveness of livestock operations-leave stockmen 
less ready to share the range with wild creatures. 
To cite a specific instance, Botswana dispatches 80 percent of its 
beef output abroad, including 30,000 tons a year to Europe. 44 When 
a European housewife goes to her local supermarket to buy beef that 
comes from Botswana, she wants it at a "reasonable" price, a price 
competitive with beef from other sources that may not feature wild 
predators as a major cause of stock losses. She thereby encourages 
unwittingly, and without malice toward the cheetah, the cattle 
raiser in Botswana to eliminate cheetah on his rangeland holding. 
Botswana contains 1500-2500 cheetah, probably the second largest 
total in Africa after Namibia, and the total is declining more rapidly 
through stock-raisers' depredations than through any other single 
cause. 45 
Similar pressures induced by advanced-world living styles cause 
African cultivators to migrate into savannah grasslands. The flood 
of landless people heading for cheetah habitats could be stemmed 
" FAD, State of Food and Agriculture 1975 (1976). 
" AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA: AN ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT (J. Heyer, J. Maitha 
& W. Sengaeds 1976); REpUBLIC OF KENYA, I-II DEVELOPMENT PLAN 1974-78 (1974) . 
.. See Rake, Botswana Economic Survey. AFRICAN DEV. 93-102 (Jan. 1976); Rake, Botswana 
Economic Survey, AFRICAN DEV. 888-916 (Sept. 1976) . 
.. See Myers, supra note 1. 
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somewhat through more favorable trade terms in international mar-
kets. For example, a Kenya farmer must now sell three times as 
much coffee to buy a foreign-made piece of machinery, e.g. a light 
tractor, as in 1960.46 He can earn a tolerable cash income from two 
acres of coffee in the more productive parts of Kenya, but he must 
cultivate six to eight acres of maize in savannah areas to ensure the 
same income. Insofar as he usually receives little more in real terms 
for his coffee than in 1960, he sees diminishing cause to stick with 
the cash crop; by consequence, he is increasingly inclined to aban-
don attempts to make a living off a small patch of high-productivity 
land and to join the throngs headed for the savannah grasslands. 
Moreover, the greatest share ofthe profit from powder coffee accrues 
after the raw beans have left AfricaY If processing of beans were 
permitted before export, the crop could be made much more profita-
ble for Africa's coffee growers. But the multinational corporations 
that dominate the coffee trade generally refuse to purchase coffee 
in any form other than raw beans, so that they can retain the high-
profit processing. In this sense, the cheetah's life-support systems 
extend to the American breakfast table, where coffee is the com-
modity which has shown least price increase (the present temporary 
peak apart) during the past 20 years.48 Much the same applies to 
consumers in advanced nations when they purchase other goods 
.. The present price bonanza for coffee is not likely to persist any more than the (smaller) 
surge in prices in 1972-73. These short-term phenomena make little difference to the long-
term trend for coffee prices. See INTERNATIONAL COFFEE ORGANIZATION, MONTHLY BULLETIN 
(April, Dec. 1976, Jan., April 1977). KENYA COFFEE BOARD, MONTHLY BULLETIN (Aug., Nov. 
1976, Jan., March 1977). See also THE HASLEMERE GROUP, COFFEE: A STUDY OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COFFEE TRADE AND THE INTERNATIONAL COFFEE AGREEMENT (1974); Raphael, Boost for 
Africa's Coffee, AFRICAN DEV. 35 (1975); Raphael, Commodity Agreement Prospects; Coffee, 
AFRICAN DEV. 487 (May 1976); P. STREETEN & D. ELSON, DIVERSIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT: 
THE CASE OF COFFEE (1971); WORLD DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT, THE WORLD IN YOUR COFFEE CUP 
(1976). It is true that the wholesale price of green coffee has increased from 72 cents per pound 
in 1974-75 to 142 cents in early 1977 and seems likely to climb still higher during 1977. This 
is due, however, to a severe frost in 1975 in Brazil, the world's largest producer, which cut 
output by almost three-quarters; to a "rust" blight on coffee trees in Nicaragua; and to civil 
disorders in Angola and Uganda-all of which factors have greatly reduced the amount of 
coffee available for world markets. None of these factors seems likely to persist as a perma-
nent phenomenon and the most significant of them, the Brazil frost disaster, is already being 
left behind as new plantings replace those lost. By 1978 coffee prices should be declining and, 
if total productivity is restored, 1979 prices could be little different from 1975 prices (after 
allowing for inflation). 
" [d . 
.. [d. 
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from developing Africa, such as tea,49 cotton goods, 50 and sisal, 51 
which are subject to the same marketing systems as coffee. 
The cheetah's survival is thus determined not only by direct 
changes in physiobiotic environment of its wildland habitats. It is 
influenced by the socioeconomic environment of emergent Africa 
which is shaped by life styles in the developed world. These 
ecological-economic linkages among the international community 
are little recognized to date, but they represent a significant factor 
for land use patterns in Africa's savannahs. Africa, primarily an 
agricultural region, will either develop extensive agriculture that is 
wasteful of land, or intensive, efficient agriculture, the choice de-
pendent in part on Africa's trading relationships with the developed 
world. These trading relationships thus have deep significance for 
Africa's wildlife. 
Insofar, then, as people of advanced countries bear a responsibil-
ity for the cheetah's plight, they should be required to pay part of 
the price of ensuring the cheetah a future. Institutional initiatives 
to this end will be considered later in this paper. 
(c) Spillover Aspects of the Situation 
Pressures, from inside and from outside Africa, constitute 
"spillover effects" of people's activities as they impinge on the chee-
tah's existence. Spillover effects arise when the activities of a person 
or a group of persons produce unintended side-effects on other per-
sons or groups.52 Generally speaking, no compensatory adjustment 
of the external relationship is automatically available. Since these 
spillover effects lie at the heart of the cheetah problem, measures 
.. See Raphael, Tea: Problems Between Producers, AFRICAN DEV. 489 (May 1976). See 
also, with regard generally to commodities and primary products from Africa, Rake, Africa's 
Commodities, AFRICAN DEV. 18 (Sept. 1975); RAKE, UNCTAD-Kenya, 1976 AFRICAN DEV. 476 
(May 1976); Rake, Commodities Start Uphill Climb, AFRICAN DEV. 563 (June 1976). 
50 See Rake, Kenya Textiles: Problems, AFRICA DEV. 201 (March 1976) and P. KENYON, 
TEXTILES - A PROTECTION RACKET (1972). See also Rake, supra note 49. 
" See Rake, supra note 49. See also Secretariat of United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Aid, Marketing and Distribution Systems for Commodites of Export Interest to Develop-
ing Countries, SUPPORTING PAPER TD/184/supp. 4, Conference Document for UNCTAD IV, 
Nairobi, Kenya, May 1976, prepared by UNCTAD Secretariat, Geneva, Switzerland (1976). 
52 For elaboration of the pervasive phenomenon of externalities in environmental conserva-
tion, see Ayres & Kneese, Production, Consumption and Externalities, 59 AM. ECON. REv. 
282 (1969); Burrows, External Costs and the Visible Arm of the Law, 22 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 
(NEW SERIES) 39 (1970); Mishan, The Spillover Enemy: The Coming Struggle for Amenity 
Rights, 33 ENCOUNTER (1969); E. MISHKIN, TECHNOLOGY AND GROWTH: THE PRICE WE PAY. 
(1970); Coase Theorem Symposium 13-14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 557 (1973-74). 
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for the cheetah's protection need to account for them. 
To the extent that the problem of declining wildlife in Africa now 
constitutes a pervasive spillover effect of man's activities, threat-
ened species may not be saved merely by finding malefactors bent 
on the species' destruction. Rather, economic forces which indi-
rectly destroy the species should be recognized as the principal cul-
prit. This conclusion is a departure from the 1960's way of looking 
at the position, when the good guys (conservationists) could run 
down the bad guys (poachers). Now there is generally only one 
category of participant: consumer. Some people in Africa consume 
land, other people outside Africa consume products of that land. 
Even the conservationist's perspective-insofar as he is a con-
sumer-may accord with that of other citizens who pursue their 
legitimate self-interest without regard for the manifold unintended 
consequences of their actions. 
NEED FOR NEW CONSERVATION MEASURES 
In these circumstances, simple protection measures such as safe-
guarding relict numbers of a threatened species,53 or preserving a 
crucial sector of a species' habitat,54 may soon prove far from suffi-
cient for many threatened species'needs. That approach is akin to 
trying to seclude wildlife altogether from an ostensibly hostile world 
of economic development. Emergent Africa is becoming too crowded 
for a "last-ditch sanctuary" strategy of that sort. In any case, so 
many species may soon be threatened that even an appreciable 
increase of conservation resources could prove incapable of limiting 
development. Increased resources will not remedy the problem as 
long as localized, fragmentary conservation programs treat symp-
toms rather than causes of destructive processes. Conservationists 
must seek ways to enable threatened wildlife to survive as exten-
sively as possible in wildland habitats, in harmony instead of in 
conflict with economic activities. For this reason, the cheetah, with 
its low densities and wide-ranging needs, may serve as an experi-
mental model with relevance to the general problem of threatened 
wildlife in Africa. 
53 For example, remnant groups of the white rhinoceros have been gathered together so that 
they may be afforded special protection in several parks and reserves in South Africa and 
elsewhere. 
54 For example, the mountain gorilla is safeguarded by setting aside a number of localities 
in its main range along the Uganda-Rwanda-Zaire borders, to make up four parks and re-
serves established with the prime purpose of protecting the gorilla. 
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Far from intending harm to the cheetah through spillover pres-
sures, many people in the advanced world show great interest in 
African wildlife. They presumably prefer that the cheetah continue 
to exist in adequate numbers. If they could exercise a choice, they 
might be willing to pay to ensure the cheetah's survival through the 
marketplace. Perhaps the time has come when people should pay 
to enjoy the "goods and services" which the cheetah represents, and 
pay through some substitute marketplace. 
BENEFITS DERIVED FROM THE CHEETAH'S EXISTENCE 
People receive "benefits" from the cheetah's existence. These 
benefits arise mainly in the form of various satisfactions at the 
knowledge that the creature still survives in Africa. Significant as 
these benefits may be, people receive them free, because the chee-
tah's existence is not traded in the marketplace in competition with 
other goods and services among which consumers choose. So it costs 
nothing for wildlife supporters outside Africa to enjoy the satisfac-
tions which the cheetah provides. But, just as people have not had 
to pay for the cheetah's survival, they now have little opportunity 
to pay to prevent its demise. In economic terms, they cannot express 
their preference through marketplace mechanisms for registering 
evaluation of the goods and services in question.55 As Kahn ex-
pressed this general constraint with reference to other goods and 
services, the consumer is "victimised by the narrowness of the con-
text within which he exercises his sovereignty."58 
Yet there is little doubt that the satisfaction which many people 
55 When wildlife is evaluated in market terms, its "worth" may be compared with other 
goods and services with which it comes into conflict, and the various trade-offs involved in 
conserving wildlife may be more rationally appraised. Putting a price tag on wilderness 
"goods and services" in North America has been mainly confined to evaluatory analysis of 
recreation experience, whether with regard to wilderness environments such as Yosemite Park 
or wildlife-related activities such as hunting and fishing. This is only partially applicable to 
the problems posed by African wildlife as a whole, let alone one particular species such as 
the cheetah. But the methodology proposed could be of some relevance to resource economics 
analysis in Africa. See, for example, N. COOMBER & A. BISWAS, EVALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
INTANGIBLES (1973); C. CICCHETTI, J. SENECA & P. DAVIDSON, THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF 
OUTDOOR RECREATION (1969); NATURAL ENVIRONMENTS: STUDIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED 
ANALYSIS (J. Krutilla ed. 1972); Pearse, A New Approach to The Evaluation of Non-Priced 
Recreational Resources, 44 LAND ECON. 87 (1968). A preliminary attempt to evaluate the loss 
to society consequent upon the extinction of a species is available in Bachmura, The Econom-
ics of Vanishing Species, 11 NAT. RESOURCES J. 674 (1971) . 
.. Kahn, The Tyranny of Small Decisions: Market Failures, Imperfections, and the Limits 
of Economics, 19 KYKLOS 24 (1966). 
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receive from the cheetah's existence is substantial. As a crude mini-
mal measure of this satisfaction, a 1972 television program in North 
America indicated much interest in the cheetah. Thirty-three mil-
lion people watched the program at prime timeY These viewers 
expressed their interest in the cheetah by giving up a substantial 
amount of a highly valuable commodity, leisure time. This com-
modity is sufficiently intertradeable with other goods and services 
to allow evaluation of it almost as a currency. 58 Various approxima-
tions of leisure time's "worth" have been proposed, with one dollar 
an hour often accepted as a minimum working figure (1973 value). 
This means that 33 million people watching a half-hour program 
could be said to display a minimal evaluation of the cheetah totall-
ing $16.5 million. One could suppose that similar evaluations have 
been displayed, and benefits received, when the television film was 
shown in Europe. 
Additional interest has been shown through the sales of Joy Ad-
amson's two books on her tame cheetah.59 Including foreign transla-
tions, sales exceed two million copies.80 If each copy, generally pap-
erback, costs an average of $1.50, and reading time takes two hours, 
this represents a proxy evaluation of $7 million. Of course people 
derive pleasure from reading the book b~yond satisfaction at the 
cheetah's existence, since they enjoy relaxation which is not exclu-
sively determined by their interest in the cheetah. The same is true 
of television viewing, but a minimal evaluation evinced by this read-
ership and television audience could be set, albeit in very crude and 
preliminary terms, at something over $20 million. 
Of course this does not mean-and this critical reservation is 
'7 Figures from A.C. Nielson Company, New York, personal communication (1974). For 
figures on television viewing in Europe, see BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION, WILDLIFE 
PROGRAMMES ON TELEVISION, AUDIENCE RESEARCH REpORT (1974). 
50 See Becker, A Theory of the Allocation of Time, 75 ECON. J. 493 (1965); Dickens, How 
to Use Time, NEW SOCIETY 566 (Sept. 1973); A. Evans, A General Theory ofthe Allocation of 
Time, (unpublished manuscript, Dep't of Economics) Univ. of Glasgow (1969); I. Harrison 
& E. Quarmby, The Value of Time, in CosT-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 173 (R. Layard ed. 1972); 
Johnson, Travel Time and Price of Leisure, 4 W. ECON. J. 135 (1966); S. LINDER, THE HARRIED 
LEISURE CLASS (1970); Time Research Note No. 16 (Papers and Proceedings of a Conference 
on Research into the Value of Time, Department of the Environment, London, N. Mansfield 
ed. 1971); Symposium: Time in Economic Life, 87 Q.J. ECON. 627 (1973); and Watson & 
Mansfield, The Valuation of Time in Cost-Benefit Studies, in COST BENEFIT AND COST 
EFFECTIVENESS 222 (J. Wolfe ed. 1973). 
51 J. ADAMSON, THE SPOTTED SPHINX (1969); J. ADAMSON, PIPPA'S CHALLENGE (1971) . 
•• Figures from publishers of two books in question, id., in North America and Europe, 
personal communications (1976). 
1976] CHEETAH UNDER THREAT 633 
stressed-that people would thereby be prepared to put up sums 
anywhere near this amount in order to assist the cheetah's survival. 
Readiness to watch a television program or read a book need not 
translate into willingness to donate funds to keep the cheetah 
alive. 61 Whether people in affluent nations would be prepared to go 
along with conservation proposals that entail outlays of sufficient 
funds for the cheetah, is another matter altogether. The analysis 
here, of the cheetah's worth in dollar figures, is presented merely as 
an attempt to show that a reckoning of people's evaluation of their 
interest in the cheetah-a partial reckoning, calculated in minimal 
terms-results in a sum way beyond the costs that would be entailed 
in establishing effective conservation measures on the ground in 
Africa. 
THE CHEETAH AS A COMMON HERITAGE AND COMMON PROPERTY 
RESOURCE 
As indicated above, the cheetah affords satisfaction to society at 
large. Society will presumably continue to receive satisfaction from 
the cheetah in the future if the creature is still in existence. To this 
degree, the cheetah constitutes part of the common heritage. 
Implicit in the first part of this article is the premise that the 
cheetah is worth saving. Although this has been assumed, more 
explicit evaluation may be appropriate. The fact that the cheetah 
is a charismatic creature as compared with a snake should help in 
generating public support for conservation programs. Yet this char-
isma is not the only outstanding characteristic of the cheetah. The 
species plays an important role in regulating savannah ecosystems. 
By virtue of its susceptibility to "natural" threats, the cheetah per-
haps serves as an "indicator species" that gives early warning of 
environmental stress. This attribute, however, is not likely to carry 
any more weight with African stockmen than moves to bring back 
the wolf would appeal to American ranchers. Other characteristics 
are worth consideration. The cheetah could conceivably present 
benefits with respect to human health. The animal can accelerate 
from a standing start to 40 miles per hour in a couple of strides, and 
" See text at notes 68·92, infra for an outline of some potential ways to translate putative 
"public interest" into specific conservation measures with some indication of order·of-
magnitude costs. These costs prove to be well below the minimal evaluation of the cheetah's 
"worth" as postulated in this article, put (as a preliminary calculation) at something over 
$20 million. 
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then maintain a 60-mile per hour chase for several hundred yards. 
A creature which can tolerate a sudden and severe oxygen debt of 
that order may present clues for treatment of blood pressure and 
heart diseases in humans. Such pragmatic considerations, however, 
should not constitute the main argument for saving the cheetah. 
The principal reason for saving the cheetah is that it is there, noth-
ing else is like it, and its disappearance could not be reversed by 
human ingenuity. Future generations should not be deprived of the 
satisfactions offered by the cheetah. 
The cheetah, then, constitutes a "common heritage resource" of 
unique value. As such it deserves exceptional measures for its pro-
tection. At the same time, however, the cheetah tends to be treated, 
for reasons of institutional deficiency, as a "common property re-
source," subject to exceptional degrees of destruction.62 
.. The term "common property" is sometimes and inaccurately thought to refer to re-
sources for which no specific persons or groups can be identified as exercising private owner-
ship. This is not correct. Strictly speaking, "common property" refers only to those resources 
for which institutional measures have been established to express the community's interest 
in terms approximating property rights. That is to say, they have been designated as property 
of the community in general, res communis, rather than property of nobody in particular, 
res nullius. See Angelo, The Need for Strengthening Legal Systems for Protection of the 
Environment, in-THE ENVIRONMENTAL FuTuRE 613 (N. Polunin ed. 1972); D. JOHNSTON, THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAw OF FISHERIES (1965). Institutional measures of this sort usually facilitate 
a regulatory system that conserves and allocates resources. See S. CIRIACy-WANTRUP, RE-
SOURCE CONSERVATION: ECONOMICS AND POLICIES (3d ed. 1968)); The Economics of Environ-
mental Policy, 47 LAND ECON. 36 (1971); Ciriacy-Wantrup & Bishop, "Common Property" 
as a Concept in Natural Resources Policy, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 713 (1975). But resource 
economists frequently use the term "common property" to refer to resources for which would-
be exploiters enjoy "open access." This means the resource is available for anyone to come 
and harvest as he wishes (e.g. the man who hunts wild creatures for their products), or to 
dispose of as he thinks fit when the resource exists in competition with his exploitation of 
associated resources (e.g. the man who cultivates wildlife habitats). For purposes of this 
paper, the term is used in its latter, albeit loose, sense. For analysis of the complex field of 
common property resources in relation to environmental values, see Environmental 
Economics, 73 SWEDISH J. ECON. (1971); ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DE-
VELOPMENT, PROBLEMS OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS (1971), POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENVIRON-
MENT (1972) and PROBLEMS IN TaANSFRONTlER POLLUTION (1974); P. BARKLEY & D. SECKLER, 
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL DECAY: THE SOLUTION BECOMES A PROBLEM (1972); 
Bishop, Conceptual Economic Issues in Conserving the California Condor, in WESTERN 
AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION PROCEEDINGS 119 (1972); S. CIRIACY-WANTRUP, A. 
FREEMAN, R. HAVEMAN & A. KNEESE, THE ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1973); 
Haveman, Efficiency and Equity in Natural Resource and Environmental Policy, 55 AM, J. 
AGRICULTURAL ECON. 868 (1973); MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
FOR POLLUTION CONTROL (A. Kneese, S. Rolfe & J. Harned eds. 1972); J. KRUTILLA & A. 
FISHER, THE ECONOMICS OF NATURAL ENVIRONMENTS (1975); Myers, Wildlife of Savannahs and 
Grasslands-A Common Heritage of the Global Community, in EARTHCARE CONFERENCE, 
SIERRA CLUB NATIONAL AUDUBON SOCIETY WILDERNESS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS (in press, 
1977); The Human Environment, 12 NAT. RESOURCES J. 134 (1972); Changing Natural Re-
source Property Rights: An Overview, 15 NAT. REsOURCES J. 639 (1975). For a consideration 
1976] CHEETAH UNDER THREAT 635 
The core of the common property problem is that the cheetah 
belongs to everybody in general, but to nobody in particular. No 
property or ownership rights are vested in clearly identifiable per-
sons or groups. The cheetah's property rights are, in some sense, 
vested in the rancher on whose land an individual animal may be 
committing depredations. In other senses, the property rights ap-
pertain to the country within which the ranch is situated. At the 
same time, the cheetah "belongs" to the whole of Africa, as part of 
the continent's natural heritage. Moreover, the cheetah can be con-
sidered a legitimate interest of the world community, as part of 
mankind's patrimony. To achieve an acceptable distribution of 
these rights and responsibilities of ownership and interest is a com-
plex challenge, due to conflicting ideas of exclusive jurisdiction such 
as ranchland ownership and national sovereignty. Insofar as various 
groups have an interest in the species, responsibility for safeguard-
ing it should somehow be allocated between these groups. 
The cheetah's status as common property contrasts with the sta-
tus of private property with which the cheetah often comes into 
conflict. When an individual in Africa owns a cow, he enjoys readily 
recognizable property rights which enable and encourage him to 
take care of the animal and dissuade other people from using or 
misusing it. No one exercises property rights of this sort in the 
cheetah, so no one is endowed with the protection opportunities and 
responsibilities which are entailed in private property rights. No one 
is in a position to implement sufficient measures for the cheetah's 
survival. Wildlife agencies in Africa do what they can, but they are 
not able to offer the cheetah the degree of protection which a stock-
owner can exercise over his cattle. They find themselves trying to 
safeguard the cheetah within an institutional environment which 
tilts the balance against the cheetah and its wildland environment. 
In other words, African wildlife agencies are severely constrained by 
institutional systems-notably marketplace mechanisms-which 
favor private property (domestic stock) over common property (the 
cheetah). 
An African country can exercise ownership in the cheetah within 
its territory through legal authority. But enforcement of the law 
across large tracts of savannah for a species with such broad and 
sparse distribution is difficult. The stockman who disposes of chee-
of property rights see Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 347 
(1967); PERSPECTIVES OF PROPERTY (G. Wunderlich & W. Gibson, Jr. eds. 1972). 
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tah to prevent loss to his commercial or subsistence activities ex-
pects to escape prosecution because he knows that law enforcement 
is not widespread enough to protect the cheetah over extensive 
areas. The cultivator who digs up the cheetah's habitat cannot read-
ily be charged with any offence at all, whether legal or moral, if he 
is digging in open access territory outside a park. Like the rancher, 
he is looking after his legitimate interest of self-support, in conflict 
with the interests of society at large. But whereas the rancher delib-
erately points a gun at a cheetah, the cultivator is almost certainly 
unaware that his digging hoe is also an effective tool for destruction 
of wildlife. In fact, a hoe is even more effective than a gun, insofar 
as elimination of habitat for a population of cheetah is more final 
than destroying a single or several individuals. 
In sum, legal systems in emergent nations have generally been 
developed with the goal of promoting the rights of private property. 
They give far less attention to the needs of common property-a 
more complex concept that has only recently started to attract in-
creased attention in advanced societies. Even the United States, 
with a sophisticated legal system and advanced law enforcement 
capacities, has been far from effective in safeguarding common 
property in conflict with private property.83 
If legal systems of developing Africa tend to favor private as op-
posed to common property, the same is even more true of economic 
systems. As indicated earlier, stock owners now experience growing 
depredations of their herds by cheetah among other wild predators. 
Stockmen who kill marauding cheetah create greater public costs 
than private benefits. But, as is usual when individuals destroy 
common property resources, the rewards accrue to a small concen-
trated group of people, allowing each person of the group to derive 
appreciable benefit. By contrast, the losses being communal are 
spread among society, causing each individual's perceived loss to be 
small. Because the focus of the stockman's attention is his perceived 
legitimate self-interest, the spin-off consequences of his action may 
scarcely register with the stockman, even though he breaches the 
long-standing legal principle "Sic utere tuo ut alienum non lau-
das"-use your own property in such a way as not to harm someone 
.. As witness the failure of the law to eliminate illegal shooting of whooping cranes and bald 
eagles. This situation has improved in recent years, but not to the extent where legal fiat can 
prevent further wanton destruction of individual birds. Graham, Will the Bald Eagle Survive 
to 2076? 78 AuoBuoN 99 (1976). 
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else's. This is of course the tragic dilemma of many a "commons" 
situation. 84 
To reiterate a basic premise, no market exists for the "goods and 
services" which the cheetah's survival makes available to society, 
thus no one trades in the cheetah's continued existence. If such 
trading opportunity existed, customers could demonstrate by their 
dollar votes how far they opt for the cheetah's survival in preference 
to other goods and services such as cheap food or a new set of 
clothes.65 The lack of opportunity for the consumer to indicate a 
preference means the cheetah's worth cannot be priced in the way 
most goods and services are. Conversely, competitive activities in 
the cheetah's savannah habitats are sensitively evaluated in the 
marketplace. Markets pay profits for these competitive activities 
when they produce beef, whereas next to nothing is paid for the 
benefits of the cheetah's existence. 
Those persons concerned about the cheetah cannot readily find 
opportunity to express their concern. Although a common property 
resource is of benefit to the community at large, it is exceptionally 
difficult to safeguard through private action. If public spirited indi-
viduals in North America and Europe were inspired by the chee-
tah's plight to make exceptional efforts to preserve it, their individ-
ual efforts would almost certainly prove inadequate. Especially in 
terms of the marketplace, their impact would be limited indeed. 
The market system, insofar as it caters at all to the cheetah's goods 
and services (for example, through wildlife-watching tourism), re-
flects only the amount that people are willing and able to pay. This 
"effective demand" is, in the cheetah's case, way below what people 
presumably would pay for the cheetah's survival if they had the 
chance and the assurance that everybody would pay his share.88 
•• Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968) . 
.. Americans and others can demonstrate some preference by going on a wildlife-viewing 
safari in Africa. But this does little to help the cheetah's cause. For one thing, tourists go to 
see lions, elephants and flamingos, as well as cheetah, and it is uncertain how much their 
enjoyment on safari would be reduced if they were deprived of the chance to see cheetah. More 
importantly, while it is true that tourists spend their money on parks and reserves which may 
thereby survive better (though even this is in doubt, see Myers, The Tourist as an Agent for 
Development and Wildlife Conservation: The Case of Kenya, 2lNT'LJ. Soc. ECON. 26 (1975)), 
cheetah conservation must direct its efforts at savannahlands outside protected areas if the 
species is to survive in adequate numbers-and these savannah territories derive little benefit 
from the tourist dollars . 
.. The free-rider dilemma confronts the would-be protector of the cheetah who cannot be 
sure that he will achieve his objective by contributing from his cash, time, and other re-
sources. He may even hope to attain the same end through what other people contribute. If 
638 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 5:617 
In common with individual beneficiaries of other common prop-
erty resources, cheetah supporters have limited scope to organize 
themselves to express their preference with concentrated clout. 
Their effect is extremely diffused, hence lacking economic impact. 
At present cheetah supporters have no opportunity, for example, to 
pay the stockman to refrain from dispatching all the cheetah he sets 
eyes on. Registering effective demand for the cheetah depends not 
only on expressing commitment through cash disbursements. It 
depends on collective action, which means that responsibility rests 
with collective authority, i.e., governments and intergovernmental 
organizationsY Collective initiatives to safeguard the collective re-
sources represented by the cheetah will almost certainly require 
funds from the collective purse. 
CONSERVATION STRATEGIES FOR THE CHEETAH 
(aJ Resolving the Conflict with Livestock Interests 
The response by stockmen to wild predators in rangeland Africa 
tends to be undiscriminating in the extreme. This is evidenced by 
broad-scale use of poison, which may not hit the relevant species at 
fault let alone the individual marauder. In parts of Kenya, Tanza-
nia, Zambia, Namibia, Rhodesia, and particularly South Africa, 
predator control in livestock areas has degenerated into a campaign 
for prophylactic extirpation of predators in general.6R At the same 
time, would-be protectors of wildlife should recognize that the live-
stock industry in Africa must remain a valid and vibrant sector of 
emergent Africa's economy. The stockman in Africa has legitimate 
interests to protect, just as does the advanced-world citizen who is 
bent on preserving the cheetah. The livestock owner is not like the 
fur dealer who exploits the cheetah with the sole aim of private 
profit; he merely wishes to ensure he does not "come out behind." 
Various possibilities exist to resolve the conflict of predators and 
livestock. These possibilities have not hitherto been investigated in 
any part of Africa due to gross lack of research funds. 8D One ap-
a significant number of participants attempt a free ride, nobody gets a ride at all. 
" For further discussion of the principle of community action to safeguard community 
resources, see J. BUCHANAN, THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF PUBLIC GOODS (1968); THE GOVER-
NANCE OF COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES (E. Haefele ed. 1974); ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS (S. 
Nagel ed. 1974); M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965). 
•• See Myers, supra note 1. 
.. See id. By comparison with conservation needs, the funds allocated to research on chee-
tah and other predators in Africa, are absurdly small. Whereas relatively substantial monies 
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proach lies in persuading the stockman to be more selective in his 
anti-predator response, by confining his attentions to those individ-
ual animals that are known to prey on domestic stock. Such random 
evidence as is available suggests that only a small number of chee-
tah regularly prey on calves and sheep.70 More information is ur-
gently needed on which sorts of domestic animals are taken. Do 
cheetah attack weak or sickly animals, i. e., animals which will die 
shortly anyway? Since herds of wildebeest and zebra have been 
known to attack cheetah and drive them off in defense of their 
young,71 perhaps a minimum size of domestic herd, with the security 
that numbers afford, would help to resist marauding cheetah. 
Stockmen might also permit a fair number of wild herbivores to 
survive on their lands. An estimate from Kenya72 suggests that if 
wildebeest, zebra, gazelle, and other species constitute 10 percent 
of herbivore biomass (total stocks measured by aggregate weight) on 
a ranch, they supply sufficient prey to all wild predators, whereupon 
stock losses remain more marginal. 73 Further possibilities lie in so-
phisticated techniques such as "aversive conditioning" of wild pre-
dators so that they avoid domestic stock, a method which has 
proved of some experimental value with coyotes in the United 
States.74 A related possibility lies in chemical compounds which 
have been spent on intensive studies of individual populations of cheetah in Serengeti, Kruger 
and other parks, and disproportionately large sums on individual animals (the research 
findings of studies of pet cheetah have little application to other cheetah), virtually no funds 




7. FAD, Wildlife Management in Kenya: Interim Report, FD:DP/KEN/71/526, FAD, 
Rome (1975). A plan has been proposed by the World Bank to offer compensatory payments 
to Masai pastoralists in Kenya, to offset competitive grazing by wild herbivores in the hinter-
land zones of Nairobi and Amboseli Parks. 
73 The potential for measures of this sort is suggested from experience in Iran. Fifteen years 
of regulation of livestock numbers to permit a recovery of wild herbivores, in conjunction with 
stringent controls to eliminate illegal hunting, has led to a marked come-back for the cheetah 
so that current stocks have probably topped 200 (nothing better than low numbers is hoped 
for due to sparse prey in semi-desert environments) (F. Harrington, personal communication 
(1975)). Few details are available, however, of the costs of this program to the Iranian com-
munity in general and to particular livestock owners. Moreover, Iran possesses sufficient 
discretionary capital in the form of oil revenues to engage in conservation activities that other 
less-endowed countries might view as luxuries. When seven million head of livestock died in 
a 1970-72 drought, most of the stock raisers in question were able to give up their traditional 
existence and migrate to the fast-developing cities. This alternative is available to stockmen 
only in the three countries of Africa (Gabon, Libya and Nigeria) that possess oil-none of 
them with significant populations of cheetah. 
H Gustavson, Garcia, Hankins & Rusiniak, Coyote Predation Control by Aversive 
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could be introduced into dipping fluid for livestock, leaving traces 
in a calfs or sheep's hide with a taste extremely repellent to cami-
vores. 75 Other methods have been proposed to tackle problems of 
wild predators and domestic stock in the United States, and some 
of them-for example, collars with spikes or bells, or other devices 
to deter predators-may be applicable in Africa. 76 
Any of these approaches would require large inputs of staff, time, 
funds, and related resources which African countries do not possess 
in large supply. This would present an opportunity for conservation-
ists outside Africa to provide the required resources. That, however, 
is a remote prospect considering the limited contributions currently 
made available from outside Africa for wildlife conservation of all 
kinds. Ironically, $2.4 million have been allocated in the United 
States for the coyote problem, on which around 120 studies are in 
progress; yet the coyote, far from being a threatened creature like 
the cheetah, is increasing its present numbers of 2-2 1/2 million. A 
mere fraction of these control funds and research budgets could 
work wonders for the cheetah in Africa, where less than ten studies 
are underway, none of them directed at the species' relationships 
with the livestock industry,11 
Perhaps the simplest and only satisfactory method to safeguard 
the cheetah is to dissuade stockmen from disposing of marauders. 
Almost certainly this implies some form of compensation. 7R Insofar 
Conditioning, 184 SCIENCE 581 (1974). The technique depends upon feeding coyotes with lamb 
carcasses laced with chemicals that cause violent vomiting for the coyotes; whereupon the 
coyotes become conditioned to take strong avoidance measures when they find themselves 
close to live lambs. Experimental trials under control conditions have proved encouraging, 
but few attempts have been made to apply the technique on a broad scale in the wild. 
75 See Myers, supra note 1. 
" For an analysis of the predator problem in the United States, with implications for 
similar situations in Africa, see Problems of Predator Control: Hearing Before Subcommit-
tee on Public Lands, Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, Comm. Print (1972). 
Berryman, The Principles of Predator Control, 36 J. WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT 395 (1972); S. 
CAIN, PREDATOR CONTROL-1971 (1972); Hornocker, Predator Ecology and Management-
What Now?, 36 J. WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT 401 (1972); F. Wagner, Coyotes and Sheep: Some 
Thoughts on Ecology, Economics and Ethics (44th Honour Lecture before the Faculty 
Association of Utah State Univ., Logan, Utah (1972)). For details on the coyote problem, and 
studies in the United States, see Terrill, Livestock Losses to Predators, in D. J. BOOKS, 
WESTERN WILDLANDS (1977). 
77 Supra note 69. 
" This compensation idea is not new in principle. A similar procedure has been proposed, 
though not yet accepted, to protect coyotes in Utah. The plan envisions that the $1 million 
damages suffered by stockmen due to coyote ravages should be made good by a state-wide 
tax of $1 on each of the state's one million taxpayers (mostly urbanites, who favor the coyote) 
as a subsidy to the livestock industry (Predator Research Group, Utah State University, 
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as the cheetah "belongs" to Africa, part of the compensation burden 
should be assumed by African countries-which, however, already 
payout significant sums to maintain wildlife. 79 
Indeed this stage of the problem is strongly marked by the socio-
economic divergence between the advanced world, where most wild-
life supporters live, and the developing world, where the threatened 
species phenomenon is growing acute. Developing countries are 
scarcely in a position to subsidize the rest of the world by safeguard-
ing mankind's heritage of wildlife species. In addition to the socio-
economic gap, a cultural dissonance between the developed and 
developing worlds persists: citizens of emergent countries do not 
yet perceive wildlife conservation with the urgency sometimes dis-
played by the affluent world. Thus, compensation for cheetah de-
predations would have to come mainly from affluent countries. 
The question then arises of how much compensation would be 
entailed. Certain countries lend themselves to this calculation bet-
ter than others. Namibia, for example, probably contains at least 
2000 cheetah. so A principal Namibian export is Karakul lamb pelts, 
to be manufactured into coats for luxury markets in North America 
and Europe. Were complete protection for the cheetah to be de-
clared and enforced in Namibia, the cost of producing Karakul pelts 
would go up. The increased costs would be reflected in fairly accur-
ate form through international trade patterns:81 enough pelts for a 
personal communication, 1976). Not only would this be equitable from the standpoint of the 
stock-owners, it would be efficient from the perspective of the community-at-large, since a 
tax is a sound way to avoid the free-rider problem (see note 66 supra). Regrettably, the Utah 
livestock industry has hitherto declined the proposal on the grounds that ranchers do not wish 
to be treated as welfare recipients. 
" For example, Tanzania devotes a larger slice of these meager national funds to Serengeti, 
Ngorongoro and other wildlife spectacles than the United States spends by proportion on its 
wildlife. I-II, UNITED REpUBLIC OF TANZANIA, TANZANIA THIRD FIVE-YEAR PLAN FOR ECONOMIC 
AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, 1975-79 (1975). Tanzania does this to safeguard what outsiders are 
not slow to remind Tanzanians is also the world's natural heritage . 
.. See Myers, supra note 1. 
HI For general treatment of international trade repercussions stemming from environmental 
protection, see d' Arge, Observations on the Economics of Transnational Environmental Ex-
ternalities (paper presented at Conference on Economics of the Environment, sponsored by 
Universities-National Bureau Committee on Economic Research in conjunction with Re-
sources for the Future (1972)); d'Arge & Kneese, Environmental Quality and International 
Trade, 26 INT'L ORG. 419 (1972); d'Arge & Kneese, The Economics of State Responsibility 
and Liability for Environmental Degradation (Working Paper No. 23, Program in Environ-
mental Economics, Univ. of Cal., Riverside (1973)); Baumol, Environmental Protection, 
International Spillovers and Trade, (Wicksell Lectures, Stockholm Univ., 1971); Coan, Hillis 
& McCloskey, Strategies for International Environmental Action, 14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 87 
(1974); Leontief, Environmental Repercussions and the Economic Structure: An Input-
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coat might cost 10 percent or even 20 percent more. This would give 
a reasonable indication of costs entailed in protecting the cheetah 
in a single country. Cheetah supporters outside Africa could then 
consider whether to pay the difference between old and new costs, 
as compensation to Namibia's stockmen who raise Karakul lambs. 
Thus the cheetah's survival in Namibia would bear a clearer price 
tag, and conservationists could decide whether or not to pick it up. 
This is not to say that compensatory payments should be made by 
individual Americans and Europeans reaching into their pockets to 
send donations to Namibia. The proposal would need to be imple-
mented through some sort of international fund, under the auspices 
of, perhaps, the United Nations Environmental Programme located 
in Nairobi.82 
In similar fashion, it is possible to make a rough estimate of 
livestock losses in other countries with significant numbers of chee-
tah (Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, and Botswana, as well as Nami-
bia). Out of a total of 6000-9000 cheetah (preliminary estimates),83 
one cheetah in ten may well depend upon domestic stock for one kill 
in ten.84 This results in a loss of domestic stock, mostly sheep and 
calves, of 4500-7000 hear per year. These domestic animals are 
worth approximately $200,000-300,000. This is an appreciable cost 
to meet each year, although not beyond the capacity of the com-
munity at large if it really wishes to protect the cheetah. It is a small 
sum compared with the hypothetical evaluation of the cheetah's 
worth estimated, as a minimum, at $20 million.85 
The five African countries listed contain perhaps half of Africa's 
present stock of cheetah.s6 In other countries with smaller and more 
Output Approach, 52 REv. ECON. & STATISTICS 262 (1970); Majocchi, The Impact of Environ-
mental Measures on International Trade: Some Policy Issues, in PROBLEMS OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
ECONOMICS 201 (1972); STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS (I. Walter ed. 
1976) . 
• z See Subpart (b), "A Trust for Threatened Species," infra. The United Nations Environ-
mental Programme (UNEP) is a recent initiative, set up as a consequence of the 1972 Stock· 
holm Conference on the Human Environment. Unlike other U.N. agencies, it is not an 
executive agency, rather it is a coordinating body. It thus seems suitable for implementation 
of international cooperative ventures such as the "global subvention" proposed in this paper. 
UNEP is already responsible for various related initiatives, such as the Washington Conven· 
tion on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 3 ENVIR. L. REp. 
1350 (1973) . 
.. See Myers, supra note 1. 
" See also, McLaughlin and N. WROGEMANN, supra note 5 . 
.. See text at notes 59, 60, supra. 
.. See Myers, supra note 1. 
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dispersed numbers of cheetah, compensation to stockmen would be 
less likely to produce a comparable return. In these other fifteen to 
twenty countries, the situation should presumably be allowed to 
decline until the cheetah eventually disappears, unless the countries 
in question can devise alternative conservation strategies with an 
acceptable equilibrium between costs and benefits. As a conse-
quence, society outside Africa would implicitly go along with the 
idea that these scattered cheetah populations in other countries are 
not worth the effort to save them. The outlays would be tacitly 
considered too large and the anticipated payoff too doubtful to 
make the investment worthwhile. For all intents and purposes, so-
ciety would decide to finance protection in a limited number of 
countries, and turn its back on cheetah in other areas. Unfeeling as 
this decision might appear to some wildlife supporters, it would at 
any rate represent an advance on the present situation, where con-
servationists ostensibly assert they wish to save every cheetah alive, 
but, for lack of adequate means to express their commitment, im-
plicitly comply with a steady decline in cheetah numbers on all 
sides. 
In terms of practical implementation of the scheme in those coun-
tries that are deemed to merit compensatory payments, a number 
of questions would have to be answered. To meet the operational 
spirit of the idea, any stockman who suffers losses through cheetah 
depredations should receive some degree of compensation; stock-
men who do not so suffer should not receive any funds. So presuma-
bly a claimant would have to demonstrate specific loss. At the same 
time, stock-raisers who receive compensation should not be allowed 
to go ahead and eliminate cheetah on their properties anyway. It is 
difficult to see how simple legal sanctions would be any more effec-
tive than existing provisions of law, due to enforcement problems 
in wide-reaching savannah zones-unless punitive measures were to 
be exceptionally severe. 
Should a stockman receive complete compensation for all 
cheetah-caused losses? Or should he not accept some degree of re-
sponsibility for such losses, on the grounds that he should be ready 
to bear certain unprofitable consequences of raising stock in savan-
nah areas? After all, he knows that in Africa's wildlands he may 
encounter drought, insect plagues, and other natural phenomena 
that deplete his grazing or otherwise undermine his way of earning 
a living, and he usually accepts these problems as part and parcel 
of trying to survive in partially hospitable, partially hostile environ-
ments. Should a stockman, in order to qualify for compensatory 
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funds, also be required to undertake, as a preliminary safeguard 
measure, some gesture that could help to keep cheetah away-for 
example, by maintaining a few large herds and flocks instead of 
many small ones (so that numbers offer some security against pre-
dators), or by using repellent dipping fluids? To undertake all such 
measures would be prohibitively expensive for almost all stock-
raisers, but perhaps those who wish to qualify for the compensation 
program should be required to take some step on their own initia-
tive. In addition, or alternatively, a stockman could be required to 
subscribe to a livestock-owners' insurance scheme against undue 
predator damages, probably subsidized by the government of the 
country in question before international compensation funds could 
be made available. 
Various other theoretical and practical questions arise. This com-
pensation proposal is suggested primarily as an instance of oppor-
tunities for society to ensure that cheetah protection does not inflict 
unduly regressive repercussions on livestock interests, with backlash 
response from stockmen who take the law into their own hands. The 
proposal is also presented as an illustration of the way society can 
express its preference through more effective action than the present 
approach with its dispersed efforts. An economic adjustment is nec-
essary if the present position is to be remedied, since wildlife conser-
vation in Africa hitherto amounts to a transfer of resources from 
Africa to the affluent world.87 
A compensation scheme would need to be subject to periodic 
07 This approach is akin in spirit to the "additionality" concept advanced at the Stockholm 
Conference on the Human Environment. This concept implies compensation payments on 
appreciable scale from the developed world to the developing world to offset adverse repercus-
sions on emergent economies arising from environmental safeguards. See Schneider-Sawiris, 
The Concept of Compensation in the Field of Trade and Environment, IUCN Environmental 
Policy and Law Paper No.4, Morges, Switzerland (1974); McLeod, Financing Environmental 
Measures in Developing Countries: The Principle of Additionality, IUCN Environmental 
Policy and Law Paper No.6, Morges, Switzerland (1974). As an instance of a high-income 
country extending a subsidy to a low-income country with the aim of modifying some produc-
tion process with adverse environmental impact, the United States has extended appreciable 
monetary assistance to Mexico to enable it to eradicate hoof-and-mouth disease in cattle. 
Clawson, Economic Development and Environmental Impact: International Aspects, in POL. 
ECON. OF ENV'T 163 (Mouton, Paris/l'he Hague (1972». In the case of the cheetah, of course, 
there would be more nations involved than just two, perhaps a dozen on either side. The need 
for a broad-scale flow of funds among the international community, to supplement market-
place and trade transactions, has been analyzed by Boulding & Pfaff, The Grants Economy 
and the Development Gap (paper presented at the Meeting of the Int'I Econ. Ass'n, Bled, 
Yugoslavia, Aug. 29, 1970), and by K. BOULDING, THE GRANTS ECONOMY IN INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE (1974). See also J. GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE (1973). 
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reappraisal. If citizens in donor countries began to object to the 
financial strain, the scheme would have to be ended. Citizens of 
donor countries would thereby act in explicit recognition of what 
prospects face the cheetah, and would have a clear recognition of 
their responsibility in the situation. This would be in marked dis-
tinction from the present position, where people in developed na-
tions have little chance to appraise their responsibility in clear-cut 
terms. Conversely, if after a few years public opinion seemed to 
favor an extension of the initiative, support could be made available 
for other countries with smaller numbers of cheetah, or the strategy 
could be extended to other threatened species whose plight lends 
itself to similar treatment. The entire project would serve as a mea-
sure of the public's readiness to pay for what it often suggests it 
wants. 
With refinements through experience, this institutional device 
could even serve as a sort of proxy pricing system to express people's 
minimal appreciation of wildlife values in question. It could develop 
into a framework which reflects costs and benefits as perceived by 
the participant parties. The basic questions are how many cheetah 
should be protected, in which areas, for what periods of time, and 
at how much cost to whose pocket. A pay-for-what-you-want ap-
proach would permit a graded response to conservation alterna-
tives.~~ The community at large could express its financial support 
for those species over those periods of time which it believes merit 
the gesture in comparison with other goods and services. This would 
relieve the "either/or" type of conflict situation where the issues are 
seen in inflexible terms. 
(b) A Trust for Threatened Species 
A dispensation of similar sort to the initiative proposed here will 
eventually be provided through the World Heritage Trust, estab-
lished by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO).~9 This institution will enable the interna-
.. This approach is analogous in spirit to the regulation of pollution in North America and 
Europe through taxes and similar adjustable penalties rather than through imposition of 
absolutist standards. The regulatory procedure is adjustable since the penalty depends upon 
the polluter's readiness to abate the source of pollution. By contrast, a legal injunction against 
pollution allows the polluter no opportunity to relate the costs and benefits of abatement 
initiatives. See Haveman, supra note 62; ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ANALYSIS (A. Kneese & B. 
Bower eds. 1966); WATER RESEARCH (A. Kneese & S. Smith'eds. 1966) . 
.. See text of the WORLD HERITAGE TRUST, CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE WORLD 
CULTURAL AND NATURAL HERITAGE, UNESCO, Paris, France. 
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tional community to provide financial support to those countries 
unable to ensure protection on their own for unique items of man-
kind's natural and cultural heritage within their national territories. 
Present provision is for each member country of UNESCO to con-
tribute an additional one percent of its customary subvention, plus 
such further funds as it wishes to demonstrate support of the Trust 
(no doubt in accord with its estimates of its citizenry's desires) .90 
In part the Trust will meet the needs of threatened species, since 
it will safeguard ecosystems which frequently offer sanctuary to 
species of localized distribution. But the cheetah illustrates the 
Trust's shortcomings for threatened species. Due to limited funds, 
and in order not to "dilute" the idea of the initiative, the Trust will 
assist only the most spectacular of Africa's parks and reserves, few 
of which contain many cheetah. 
Furthermore, the Trust concept works best in once-and-for-all 
emergencies such as the Abu Simbel temples on the River Nile, 
whose protection by UNESCO in the mid-1960's triggered the 
notion of the World Heritage Trust.B) The fund-raising campaign, 
conducted by UNESCO, raised $32 million, and saved the 5000 
year-old temples. This effort represented a pioneering initiative by 
the world community to protect a significant part of the world's 
cultural heritage. The effort was concentrated, and all necessary 
funds were raised within a short time. However, a sustained cam-
paign for funds would be more difficult to maintain. Also, the sal-
vaged temples no longer demand large amounts of resources. By 
contrast, parks and reserves require that millions of acres of poten-
tially productive land be withheld from use. 
The World Heritage Trust is simple and direct in focus. By com-
parison, proposals for compensation payments to safeguard the 
cheetah might seem excessively impractical. Why should considera-
tions of "return on investment" affect decisions to save wildlife 
species whose disappearance would represent irreversible loss? Con-
servation of the cheetah must take place, however, in the severely 
practical world of developing Africa, where land use activities are 
.. Until the United States suspended its contribution due to anti·Israel sentiment among 
many UNESCO member states, it was paying $143,000 per year. 
II Ironically, the Abu Simbel temples were originally dedicated to crocodiles which now 
need broad-based protection measures similar to those required by the cheetah. Red Data 
Book, Int'I Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), Morges, 
Switzerland (1975). Cott & Pooley, The Status of Crocodiles in Africa, Supp. Paper No. 33, 
mCN, Morges, Switzerland (1972). 
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almost always determined by marketplace evaluation. Stockmen 
presently appraise the "worth" of the cheetah through comparative 
assessment of trade-off transactions involved. They know what their 
calves are worth to them, and they care little about what the chee-
tah is worth to society, except that it does not compare in their eyes 
with the value of their stock. They unwittingly apply a form of cost-
benefit analysis which results in a decision against the cheetah. 
Their appraisal parameters should somehow be expanded to accom-
modate the externalities of their actions-the loss to the world com-
munity. This postulates a system in which people outside Africa can 
express their preferences at the margin92 as well as in total. 
An initiative along these lines would constitute a worthwhile ad-
vance over outright regulation via "blunt-instrument" -type institu-
tions such as the World Heritage Trust. After all, conservation of 
the cheetah, even in its present reduced numbers, is not worth a 
limitless commitment of financial and other resources. Indeed no 
species is beyond value, occasional conservationist assertions to the 
contrary; safeguarding the bald eagle is not worth the GNP of the 
United States, nor anything beyond a tiny fraction of it. 
CONCLUSION 
This analysis of the cheetah's niche in late 20th century Africa 
represents a new perspective for the threatened species problem. 
Protection of declining wildlife in Africa no longer depends on resist-
ing the poacher or other individuals of direct and deliberate threat 
to vulnerable species. It depends on reconciling the legitimate activ-
ities of citizens in Africa with the interests of people in the devel-
oped world-who, if they want beef from African savannahs at 
"reasonable prices," should recognize the significance of their ac-
tions. A proposal for a fresh conservation strategy based on large-
scale compensation may sound speculative at best, but it should be 
appraised in light of the options available. Present institutions offer 
no opportunity for society to express its preferences for goods with-
out a price, or to establish property rights and responsibilities for 
the common heritage. Difficult as an expanded conservation strat-
egy for the cheetah will be, the alternative is the present prospect, 
where decisions against the species are made with implicit indiffer-
ence to the values at stake . 
.. The cheetah's value "at the margin" refers to the value of individual animals as part of 
the species' stock. The conservationist's evaluation should reflect whether he is concerned 
with the last 10,000 cheetah, or the last 1000, or the last breeding pair on earth. 
